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The	  institution	  of	  society	  is	  in	  each	  case	  the	  institution	  of	  a	  magma	  of	  social	  
imaginary	  significations,	  which	  we	  can	  and	  must	  call	  a	  world	  of	  significations.	  For	  it	  
is	  one	  and	  the	  same	  thing	  to	  say	  that	  society	  institutes	  the	  world	  in	  each	  case	  as	  its	  
world	  or	  its	  world	  as	  the	  world,	  and	  to	  say	  that	  it	  institutes	  a	  world	  of	  significations	  
that	  is	  its	  own,	  in	  correlation	  to	  which,	  alone,	  a	  world	  can	  and	  does	  exist	  for	  it.	  —Cornelius	  Castoriadis,	  19741	  	  
I	  propose	  that	  instead	  of	  treating	  the	  interminable	  question	  of	  the	  capacity	  to	  act	  in	  
terms	  of	  ‘possible	  versus	  impossible,’	  we	  examine	  what	  it	  might	  mean	  to	  institute	  
‘otherwise,’	  politically	  and	  performatively,	  ‘as	  if	  it	  were	  possible.’	  —Athena	  Athanasiou,	  20162	  	  	  In	  her	  recent	  essay	  “Performing	  the	  Institution,”	  Athena	  Athanasiou	  asks	  how	  we	  can	  think	  of	  institutions,	  and	  ways	  of	  instituting,	  after	  the	  widespread	  dispossession	  of	  public	  infrastructures	  known	  as	  neoliberal	  reform	  and	  privatization.	  For	  Athanasiou,	  the	  task	  is	  not	  to	  save	  traditional	  liberal	  institutions	  under	  siege,	  but	  rather	  to	  institute	  as	  if	  
it	  were	  possible;	  with	  an	  in-­‐built	  ambivalence	  of	  Derridean	  im-­‐possibility,	  heightened	  by	  the	  three-­‐pronged	  onslaught	  of	  austerity,	  security,	  and	  post-­‐coloniality.	  The	  institution	  is	  thus	  something	  to	  be	  performed	  rather	  than	  reclaimed,	  which	  has	  a	  particular	  resonance	  in	  the	  context	  of	  contemporary	  Greece,	  and	  the	  hollowing	  out	  of	  all	  its	  institutions	  per	  decree	  of	  the	  European	  Union,	  in	  response	  to	  the	  credit	  crunch	  of	  2008.	  But	  enforced	  austerity	  and	  privatization,	  against	  the	  policies	  of	  a	  democratically	  elected	  government,	  is	  not	  the	  only	  post-­‐institutional	  fault	  line	  to	  be	  witnessed	  in	  Greece,	  as	  the	  country	  is	  also	  at	  the	  center	  of	  the	  current	  European	  refugee	  crisis.	  The	  informal	  and	  unauthorized	  response	  in	  Greece	  itself,	  as	  opposed	  to	  the	  official	  policies	  of	  policing	  of	  the	  EU,	  attests	  to	  new	  ways	  of	  performing	  the	  institution,	  of	  instituting	  despite	  impossibility,	  such	  as	  in	  the	  self-­‐organized	  refugee	  camps	  of	  Lesbos.	  Indeed,	  in	  the	  realm	  of	  contemporary	  art,	  rather	  than	  asking	  what	  we	  can	  learn	  from	  Athens—as	  is	  currently	  fashionable—should	  we	  not	  ask	  what	  we	  can	  also	  learn	  from	  Lesbos?	  Changing	  this	  line	  of	  questioning	  is	  not	  merely	  rhetorical,	  but	  has	  to	  do	  with	  instituting,	  with	  institutional	  form,	  such	  as	  the	  large	  scale	  of	  recurrent	  exhibitions	  and	  biennales.	  
	  
Instituting	  and	  the	  Imaginary	  Now,	  if	  our	  institutions	  are	  somewhat	  wanting,	  and	  even	  failing—due	  to	  defunding	  and	  delegitimizing,	  privatization	  and	  austerity—or	  seen	  as	  failing	  us	  in	  terms	  of	  representation	  and	  inclusion,	  for	  that	  matter,	  the	  notion	  of	  performing	  the	  institution	  as	  if	  it	  were	  possible,	  in	  spite	  of,	  rather	  than	  due	  to,	  the	  status	  of	  our	  current	  institutions	  and	  societies—thus	  embodying	  conditions	  of	  impossibility	  as	  the	  very	  conditions	  of	  possibility—brings	  to	  mind	  Cornelius	  Castoriadis’s	  ontological	  claim	  for	  the	  historical	  instituting	  of	  society:	  that	  we	  always	  institute,	  and,	  therefore,	  can	  always	  institute	  
differently.	  Indeed,	  the	  act	  of	  instituting,	  and	  thus	  with	  it	  institutions,	  is	  integral	  to	  the	  establishing	  of	  any	  society,	  of	  a	  society	  as	  such:	  	   That	  which	  holds	  society	  together	  is,	  of	  course,	  its	  institution,	  the	  whole	  complex	  of	  its	  particular	  institutions,	  what	  I	  call	  ‘the	  institution	  of	  a	  society	  as	  a	  whole’—the	  word	  ‘institution’	  being	  taken	  here	  in	  the	  broadest	  and	  most	  radical	  sense:	  norms,	  values,	  language,	  tools,	  procedures	  and	  methods	  of	  dealing	  with	  things	  and	  doing	  things,	  and,	  of	  course,	  the	  individual	  itself	  both	  in	  general	  and	  in	  the	  particular	  type	  and	  form	  (and	  their	  differentiations:	  e.g.	  man/woman)	  given	  to	  it	  by	  the	  society	  considered.3	  	  Institutions	  are	  here,	  then,	  not	  just	  organizational	  forms	  within	  society,	  and	  within	  modern	  societies	  in	  particular,	  but	  also	  the	  way	  in	  which	  societies	  are	  constituted	  through	  instituting	  and	  the	  imagination.	  This	  is	  a	  very	  expanded	  use	  of	  the	  notion	  of	  institution,	  encompassing	  language,	  social	  codes,	  and	  even	  relations	  and	  definitions	  of	  gender,	  but	  which	  nonetheless	  includes	  the	  particular	  institution	  in	  a	  given	  society	  that	  produces,	  performs,	  and	  maintain	  these	  norms	  and	  normative	  functions.	  The	  question,	  for	  a	  thinker	  like	  Castoriadis,	  is	  thus	  not	  so	  much	  of	  how	  institutions	  think,	  that	  is	  how	  they	  perform	  socially,	  but	  rather	  how	  they	  institute:	  what	  forms	  and	  what	  norms	  are	  being	  upheld,	  and	  practiced?	  Even	  when	  a	  society	  is	  specific,	  and	  if	  it	  is	  highly	  traditional,	  it	  is	  nonetheless	  instituted.	  And	  it	  is	  this	  very	  institution	  of	  society	  that	  makes	  a	  society,	  and	  a	  social	  order	  that	  thrives	  on	  tradition,	  or	  for	  that	  matter,	  social	  change	  and	  notions	  of	  progress	  and	  evolution,	  that	  are	  always	  merely	  social–historical	  institutions—no	  more,	  and	  no	  less.	  	  	  Moreover,	  societies	  are	  wholly	  imaginary	  institutions,	  instituted	  through	  what	  Castoriadis	  calls	  both	  “social	  imaginary	  significations”	  and	  “instituted	  social	  
imaginaries.”	  “It	  is	  the	  instituting	  social	  imaginary	  that	  creates	  institution	  in	  general	  (the	  institution	  as	  form)	  as	  well	  as	  the	  particular	  institutions	  of	  each	  specific	  society,	  and	  the	  radical	  imagination	  of	  the	  singular	  human	  being.”4	  Instituting	  is	  thus	  an	  act	  of	  the	  imagination,	  but	  with	  very	  real	  effects,	  as	  it	  is	  through	  institutions	  of	  society	  that	  our	  reality	  is	  both	  produced	  and	  reproduced.	  That	  is,	  institutions	  not	  only	  create	  social	  relations,	  but	  through	  repetitions	  also	  constantly	  attempt	  to	  reproduce	  this	  instituted	  social	  imaginary,	  this	  version	  of	  reality.	  Hence	  not	  only	  the	  institution	  of,	  say,	  the	  church	  as	  a	  discourse	  and	  physical	  space,	  but	  also	  its	  repeated	  rituals	  of	  sermons	  and	  prayers,	  reproduces	  its	  power	  and	  grip	  on	  reality,	  which	  is	  then	  further	  enhanced	  by	  its	  juridical	  entanglements	  through	  registering	  births,	  marriages	  and	  deaths.	  As	  an	  institution,	  the	  church	  has	  architecture	  that	  frames	  and	  validates	  its	  discourse,	  rituals	  that	  sediment	  its	  discourse	  into	  the	  social	  and	  keep	  the	  discourse	  actual,	  and,	  finally,	  through	  its	  discourse	  and	  rituals	  an	  institutional	  entanglement	  with	  the	  social	  in	  terms	  of	  not	  only	  the	  laws	  it	  propagates	  and	  preaches,	  but	  also	  legislates.	  Traditions	  that	  are	  upheld	  in	  both	  so-­‐called	  secular	  and	  so-­‐called	  religious	  societies,	  and	  in	  this	  sense	  there	  is	  no	  principal	  difference	  between	  a	  Lutheran	  and	  an	  Islamist	  state.	  Indeed	  both	  of	  them	  could	  be	  described	  in	  Castoriadis’s	  terms	  of	  a	  heteronymous	  society,	  more	  of	  which	  later.	  For	  now	  it	  suffices	  to	  note	  what	  a	  neat	  little	  world	  this	  produces,	  with	  very	  few	  conceptual	  creases	  in	  it,	  and	  a	  fairly	  consistent	  and	  certainly	  constant	  reproducible	  instituted	  social	  imaginary,	  but	  also	  that	  this	  is,	  of	  course,	  just	  a	  society,	  one	  possible	  social-­‐historical	  model	  of	  world-­‐making,	  not	  equal	  to	  worlding	  as	  such:	  “Neither	  is	  what	  is	  given	  an	  ensemble	  or	  a	  hierarchy	  of	  ensembles,	  an	  essence	  or	  a	  system	  of	  essences.”5	  If	  there	  is	  an	  ensemblist	  logic	  at	  play,	  this	  also	  means	  that	  other	  ensembles	  and	  assemblages	  can	  be	  imagined—it	  is	  always	  possible	  to	  institute	  another	  world.	  	  However,	  it	  is	  needed	  to	  go	  further,	  as	  Castoriadis	  conceives	  of	  the	  imaginary	  as	  not	  only	  that	  which	  institutes	  society	  in	  general,	  its	  beliefs,	  languages,	  social	  norms,	  and	  so	  on,	  and	  its	  particular	  institutions	  of	  instituting,	  so	  to	  say,	  from	  nation-­‐states	  to	  armies,	  from	  courthouses	  to	  art	  galleries,	  etc.,	  but	  also	  the	  imagination	  of	  the	  singular	  human	  being,	  as	  stated	  above.	  What	  is	  instituted	  are	  not	  only	  subjects—of	  the	  state,	  of	  various	  institutional	  spaces—but	  also	  subjectivity	  itself.	  Our	  sense	  of	  self,	  and	  how	  our	  imagination	  works,	  as	  individuals,	  and	  thus	  including	  our	  dreams	  and	  dream	  worlds,	  are	  always	  part	  and	  parcel	  of	  a	  social-­‐historical	  situation,	  or	  social	  imaginary	  significations,	  even	  when	  we	  try	  to	  break	  with	  our	  background,	  our	  roots,	  traditions,	  and	  desires.	  	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  our	  imagination	  is	  not	  limited	  to	  the	  social-­‐historical,	  and	  can	  indeed	  surpass	  it,	  imaginatively,	  which	  is	  why	  Castoriadis	  uses	  the	  term	  radical	  imagination,	  
and	  why	  he	  privileges	  art	  among	  the	  major	  modern	  forms	  of	  the	  imagination	  he	  identifies,	  which	  also	  include	  philosophy,	  science	  and	  politics.	  Art	  is	  precisely,	  in	  this	  view,	  that	  which	  epitomizes	  “…	  creation	  ex	  nihilo,	  bringing	  into	  being	  a	  form	  that	  was	  not	  here	  before,	  the	  creation	  of	  new	  forms	  of	  being,”6	  which	  was,	  naturally,	  one	  of	  the	  declared	  goals	  of	  modern	  art,	  and	  perhaps	  modernism	  in	  general,	  and	  aligns	  Castoriadis	  squarely	  with	  modernist	  thought	  rather	  than	  postmodernism.	  Nonetheless,	  Castoriadis	  departs	  radically	  from	  two	  of	  the	  most	  dominant	  modes	  of	  thinking	  about	  the	  subject	  and	  history	  in	  modernity,	  namely	  psychoanalysis	  and	  Marxism.	  As	  should	  be	  obvious	  from	  the	  above,	  Castoriadis’s	  use	  of	  the	  term	  the	  Imaginary	  has	  nothing	  in	  common	  with	  the	  famous	  Lacanian	  term,	  and	  even	  though	  he	  had	  a	  background	  as	  a	  psychoanalyst,	  the	  imagination	  of	  the	  individual,	  albeit	  social-­‐historical,	  was	  not	  fully	  caught	  in	  a	  cruel	  double-­‐bind	  between	  the	  real	  and	  the	  imaginary,	  the	  ego	  and	  the	  unconscious,	  but	  had	  the	  capability	  for	  radical	  imagination,	  and	  thus	  radical	  break	  with	  the	  perceived	  real,	  and	  psychoanalysis	  is,	  as	  such,	  merely	  a	  way	  of	  instituting	  the	  social.	  Similarly,	  Castoriadis,	  who	  was	  also	  trained	  as	  an	  economist,	  broke	  with	  determinist	  Marxism,	  and	  its	  orthodoxies	  of	  base	  and	  superstructure,	  and	  how	  economic	  changes	  in	  the	  base	  lead	  to	  political	  changes	  in	  the	  superstructure.	  Instead,	  he	  attributed	  social	  and	  political	  changes,	  particularly	  radical	  and	  revolutionary	  ones,	  purely	  to	  the	  (radical)	  imagination.	  The	  supersession	  of	  contemporary	  capitalist	  society	  will	  not	  occur	  “[…]	  because	  such	  are	  the	  laws	  of	  history,	  the	  interests	  of	  the	  proletariat	  or	  the	  destiny	  of	  being,”	  but,	  rather,	  “[…]	  because	  we	  will	  it	  and	  because	  we	  know	  that	  others	  will	  it	  as	  well,”	  as	  he	  famously	  wrote	  toward	  the	  conclusion	  of	  his	  magnum	  opus,	  aptly	  titled	  The	  Imaginary	  
Institution	  of	  Society.7	  	  In	  this	  theory	  of	  the	  imaginary,	  and	  politics	  of	  the	  imagination,	  any	  radical	  social,	  political,	  or	  indeed	  aesthetic	  change	  cannot	  be	  predicted	  or	  prescribed,	  and	  occurs	  through	  discontinuity	  rather	  than	  continuity,	  either	  in	  the	  form	  of	  radical	  innovation	  and	  creativity,	  in	  art	  or	  in	  science,	  or	  in	  the	  shape	  of	  symbolic	  and	  political	  revolutions	  that	  can	  never	  be	  truly	  predicted	  or	  understood	  in	  terms	  of	  determinate	  causes	  and	  effects,	  or	  an	  inevitable	  historical	  sequence	  of	  events.	  Rather,	  change	  emerges	  through	  the	  projecting,	  positing,	  and	  implementation,	  without	  predeterminations,	  of	  other	  imaginaries	  of	  the	  present,	  and	  of	  the	  future,	  than	  the	  already	  socially	  instituted	  and	  repeated	  political	  imaginaries.	  This	  requires	  a	  radical	  break	  with	  the	  past,	  though,	  in	  terms	  of	  language	  and	  symbolization,	  and	  thus	  of	  ways	  of	  doing,	  practicing	  other	  ways	  of	  instituting,	  and	  thus	  other	  institutional	  forms.	  As	  institutions,	  also	  those	  of	  artistic	  production	  and	  circulation	  of	  discourse,	  are	  part	  of	  symbolic	  significations,	  and	  as	  such	  
they	  are	  not	  fixed	  or	  stable,	  but	  constantly	  articulated	  through	  praxis.	  Any	  society	  must	  be	  instituted	  as	  symbolic	  constructions,	  held	  together	  by	  specific	  social	  imaginaries	  and	  institutions,	  which	  solidifies	  social	  imaginary	  signification	  into	  instituted	  social	  imaginaries.	  If	  a	  particular	  institution	  of	  society,	  specific	  or	  historical,	  thus	  comes	  to	  be	  viewed	  as	  inaccurate	  or	  obsolete,	  false	  even,	  it	  will	  mean	  the	  collapse	  of	  that	  given	  institution	  or	  even	  society,	  the	  way	  in	  which	  historical	  empires	  have	  crumbled	  and	  fallen,	  only	  to	  be	  replaced,	  in	  turn,	  by	  another	  wholly	  imaginary,	  but	  instituted	  order	  of	  society.	  Social	  imaginaries	  can	  thus	  be	  actively	  redefined	  through	  other	  instituting	  practices,	  and	  existing	  ones	  collapsed	  when	  no	  longer	  viewed	  as	  adequate,	  just	  or	  true.	  Why	  is	  this	  so?	  What	  makes	  radical	  change	  possible,	  if	  not	  historical	  conditions	  and	  social	  causes?	  The	  answer	  lies,	  partly,	  in	  the	  paradoxes	  and	  aporias	  involved	  in	  any	  identitarian	  logic,	  no	  matter	  how	  institutionally	  solidified	  it	  appears,	  and	  no	  matter	  how	  deep	  its	  roots	  seem,	  and	  how	  strong	  its	  pillars	  of	  tradition	  look,	  as	  these	  are,	  ontologically	  speaking,	  wholly	  imaginary.	  Moreover,	  no	  matter	  how	  far	  and	  long	  a	  particular	  imaginary	  has	  been	  socially	  instituted,	  there	  is	  always	  a	  before,	  as	  well	  as	  a	  
beyond.	  	  This	  is	  the	  element	  that	  Castoriadis	  names,	  perhaps	  somewhat	  unwieldy,	  a	  
magma:	  “What	  we	  seek	  to	  understand	  is	  the	  mode	  of	  being	  of	  what	  gives	  itself	  before	  identitary	  or	  ensemblist	  logic	  is	  imposed,”8	  [my	  italics],	  to	  be	  understood	  at	  the	  level	  of	  both	  history	  and	  subjectivity.	  Indeed	  Castoriadis	  goes	  on	  to	  write	  that	  the	  term	  magma	  is	  chosen	  in	  order	  to	  avoid	  a	  formal	  definition	  in	  an	  already	  received	  language,	  as	  it	  precedes	  and	  exceeds	  it,	  and	  is	  thus	  not	  only	  before,	  but	  also	  beyond:	  “A	  magma	  is	  that	  from	  which	  one	  can	  extract	  (or	  in	  which	  one	  can	  construct)	  an	  indefinite	  number	  of	  ensemblist	  organizations	  but	  which	  can	  never	  be	  reconstituted	  (ideally)	  by	  a	  (finite	  or	  infinite)	  ensemblist	  composition	  of	  these	  organizations.”9	  	  Again,	  this	  points	  to	  the	  always	  possible,	  if	  unexpected	  and	  implausible,	  radical	  break	  with	  the	  past	  and	  the	  present,	  and	  that	  the	  elements	  of	  society	  (as	  a	  set)	  can	  be	  configured	  and	  reconfigured	  indefinitely,	  but	  also,	  and	  crucially,	  not	  only	  that	  things	  can	  be	  recomposed,	  and	  instituted	  differently,	  but	  no	  imaginary	  institution	  of	  society	  can	  ever	  be	  complete,	  neither	  historically	  nor	  actually.	  It	  can	  never	  be	  eternal,	  and	  it	  can	  never	  be	  total,	  despite	  its	  stronghold,	  or	  stranglehold	  for	  that	  matter,	  on	  our	  reality.	  Ironically,	  what	  then	  escapes	  any	  instituted	  social	  imaginary	  “is	  the	  very	  being	  of	  society	  as	  instituting,	  that	  is	  to	  say,	  ultimately,	  society	  as	  the	  source	  and	  origin	  of	  otherness	  or	  perpetual	  self-­‐alteration.”10	  	  
To	  put	  it	  more	  concretely	  in	  terms	  of	  art,	  politics,	  and	  the	  politics	  of	  art	  institutions,	  the	  aim	  is	  not	  anti-­‐institutional,	  indeed	  it	  never	  could	  be,	  but	  about	  of	  self-­‐instituting.	  There	  are	  different	  ways	  of	  instituting,	  and	  any	  alternative	  culture,	  groundbreaking	  science,	  or	  political	  rupture	  must	  do	  precisely	  that:	  institute	  differently—on	  the	  level	  of	  discourse	  and	  history,	  as	  well	  as	  in	  the	  intricacies	  of	  actual	  institutional	  forms,	  and	  in	  the	  radical	  imagination	  of	  both	  the	  singular	  human	  being	  and	  how	  we	  signify	  and	  define	  the	  subject	  anew.	  In	  effect,	  it	  is	  about	  creating	  a	  new	  language	  with	  which	  to	  say	  things,	  not	  just	  saying	  the	  same	  things	  with	  new	  words.	  Castoriadis	  thus	  distinguishes	  between	  two	  very	  different	  forms	  of	  imaginary	  institutions	  of	  society,	  the	  heteronymous	  and	  the	  
autonomous,	  both	  of	  which	  are	  instructive	  in	  a	  conversation	  about	  the	  institution	  of	  art,	  and	  how	  art’s	  institutions	  think,	  and	  indeed	  institute.	  	  
The	  Heteronymous	  and	  the	  Autonomous	  The	  distinction	  between	  opposing	  ways	  of	  instituting	  is	  crucial,	  partly	  in	  differentiating	  the	  concept	  of	  the	  institution	  from	  ideas	  more	  common	  to	  the	  art	  world—	  of	  discursive	  formations	  or	  of	  hegemony—but	  more	  importantly	  in	  moving	  from	  an	  ontological	  proposition	  for	  understanding	  societies	  toward	  a	  political	  position	  for	  changing	  them.	  While	  all	  societies	  make	  their	  own	  imaginaries—institutions,	  laws,	  traditions,	  beliefs,	  behaviors,	  and	  so	  on,	  autonomous	  societies	  are	  for	  Castoriadis	  those	  in	  which	  the	  members	  of	  that	  specific	  society	  are	  aware	  of	  its	  imaginary	  institution	  and	  thus	  explicitly	  self-­institute.	  Again, autonomy	  does	  here	  not	  imply	  anti-­‐institutionalization,	  but	  self-­‐institutionalization	  as	  a	  continuous	  project	  of	  self-­‐alteration,	  which	  accounts	  for	  an	  autonomous	  society’s	  temporality,	  and	  thus	  encompassing	  its	  historicity,	  contemporaneity	  and	  futurity,	  but	  without	  conflating	  them,	  or	  having	  one	  cancel	  out	  the	  other.11	  In	  contrast,	  the	  members	  of	  heteronymous	  societies	  do	  not	  think	  of	  their	  societies	  as	  self-­‐instituted,	  and	  thus	  necessarily	  as	  perpetually	  self-­‐alterating,	  but	  rather	  attribute	  their	  imaginary	  order	  to	  something	  outside	  society	  itself:	  to	  some	  extra-­‐social	  authority,	  be	  it	  deity,	  tradition,	  progress,	  historical	  necessity	  or	  the	  like.	  	  	  The	  distinction	  between	  the	  autonomous	  and	  the	  heteronymous	  can	  also	  be	  employed	  in	  thinking	  about	  how	  the	  institutions	  of	  art	  think,	  and,	  indeed,	  institute.	  It	  will	  be	  necessary,	  though,	  to	  create	  a	  formal	  distinction	  between	  art	  as	  an	  institution,	  in	  the	  abstract	  sense,	  but	  as	  an	  instituted	  social	  imaginary	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  and	  then	  the	  specific	  institutions	  of	  the	  art	  world,	  in	  the	  concrete	  sense	  of	  academies,	  galleries,	  museums	  etc.,	  as	  the	  places	  that	  institute	  in	  a	  specific	  way,	  be	  it	  repetitively	  or	  alterating,	  autonomously	  or	  heteronymously,	  on	  the	  other	  hand.	  Now,	  to	  the	  extent	  that	  
Art,	  with	  a	  capital	  A,	  is	  referred	  to	  as	  an	  essential	  and	  a-­‐historical	  category,	  it	  is	  at	  once	  autonomous	  and	  heteronymous.	  It	  is	  autonomous	  as	  it	  is	  separate	  from	  its	  social-­‐historical	  existence	  in	  the	  sense	  of	  economic	  structures,	  educational	  spaces,	  etc.,	  creating,	  in	  the	  words	  of	  Pierre	  Bourdieu	  “relatively	  autonomous	  social	  universes	  where	  economic	  necessities	  are	  (partially)	  suspended,”	  which	  requires	  willful	  self-­‐institutionalization	  of	  this	  sphere	  or	  universe,	  or	  social	  imaginary,	  if	  you	  will.12	  And	  it	  is	  heteronymous	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  it	  is	  claimed	  to	  be	  constant,	  a	  force	  of	  human	  nature,	  existing	  outside	  of	  any	  social-­‐historical	  institution	  of	  society.	  It	  is	  this	  dualism	  and	  contradiction	  that	  haunts	  art	  and	  its	  ways	  of	  instituting	  today,	  and	  it	  is	  most	  likely	  what	  made	  Bourdieu	  supply	  his	  theory	  of	  the	  avant-­‐garde	  and	  its	  strive	  toward	  artistic	  autonomy	  with	  a	  number	  of	  caveats,	  by	  making	  autonomy	  relative,	  and	  economics	  (i.e.	  the	  social-­‐historical	  in	  Castoriadis’s	  terms)	  only	  partially	  suspended	  in	  the	  equation!	  	  	  Indeed,	  artistic	  autonomy	  has	  long	  been	  a	  treasured	  and	  contested	  concept	  within	  art,	  particularly	  as	  it	  has	  been	  introduced	  with	  the	  advent	  of	  modernity,	  and	  the	  relationship	  of	  modern	  art	  as	  a	  style	  to	  the	  period	  of	  modernism	  and	  the	  politico-­‐aesthetic	  project	  of	  modernization	  on	  a	  global	  scale.	  The	  ways	  in	  which	  it	  has	  been	  instituted	  have	  tended	  toward	  a	  neat,	  if	  ultimately	  false	  parceling	  out	  of	  autonomy	  and	  heteronomy	  into	  artistic	  practice	  as	  preferably	  autonomous,	  and	  the	  exhibiting,	  circulation,	  and	  collecting	  of	  art	  as	  predominantly	  heteronymous.	  In	  a	  way,	  this	  was	  precisely	  the	  critique	  posited	  by	  institutional	  critique,	  which	  did	  not	  so	  much	  criticize	  artistic	  practice,	  but	  rather	  its	  cultural	  consecration	  and	  confinement	  in	  the	  museum,	  that	  is,	  its	  institutionalization.	  Art	  was	  free	  in	  its	  making,	  but	  became	  unfree	  in	  its	  circulation,	  a	  line	  of	  thinking	  that	  was,	  historically	  speaking,	  an	  attempt	  at	  gaining	  control	  over	  at	  least	  the	  radical	  imagination	  of	  the	  singular	  human	  being,	  and	  thus	  of	  being	  autonomous	  in	  a	  heteronymous	  society.	  For	  the	  historical	  avant-­‐gardes	  of	  the	  late	  nineteenth	  and	  early	  twentieth	  centuries,	  then,	  artistic	  autonomy	  walked	  hand	  in	  hand	  with	  political	  autonomy,	  at	  least	  in	  principle.	  	  	  Historically,	  the	  institutions	  of	  art	  had	  the	  role	  of	  presenting	  and	  protecting	  artistic	  autonomy,	  while	  themselves	  being	  heteronymous,	  both	  in	  a	  philosophical	  and	  a	  political	  sense.	  If	  artists	  were	  autonomous,	  institutions	  were	  not,	  or	  at	  least	  not	  wholly	  so.	  	  Rather,	  the	  museum	  was	  seen	  as	  either	  elitist,	  catering	  only	  to	  the	  upper	  classes	  and	  their	  values,	  as	  in	  the	  first	  wave	  of	  institutional	  critique,	  or,	  ironically,	  as	  populist,	  in	  its	  condescending	  and	  consumerist	  pandering	  to	  a	  mass	  public	  in	  the	  postmodern	  era,	  as	  in	  the	  second	  wave	  of	  institutional	  critique.	  The	  contemporary	  institutions	  of	  art	  are	  
positively	  haunted—to	  paraphrase	  art	  historian	  Frazer	  Ward—as	  witnessed	  by	  the	  relatively	  short-­‐lived	  phenomena	  that	  was	  New	  Institutionalism	  at	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  2000s…13	  But	  where	  there	  is	  haunting	  there	  is	  also	  futurity,	  even	  after	  things	  have	  crossed	  over,	  ended	  even,	  as	  in	  the	  notion	  of	  performing	  the	  institution	  as	  if	  it	  was	  still	  possible,	  after	  the	  defunding	  and	  closure	  of	  the	  institution,	  as	  invoked	  by	  Athanasiou.	  This	  also	  implies,	  of	  course,	  that	  the	  way	  in	  which	  to	  institute	  is	  not	  merely	  repetitive	  of	  what	  was	  seemingly	  lost,	  but	  rather	  perpetually	  self-­‐altering.	  This	  is	  a	  matter	  of	  inventing	  a	  new	  language,	  and	  not	  just	  saying	  the	  same	  old	  things	  with	  new	  words.	  This	  is	  thus	  not	  only	  a	  question	  of	  changing	  institutions,	  but	  of	  changing	  how	  we	  institute;	  how	  subjectivity	  and	  imagination	  can	  be	  instituted	  in	  a	  different	  way.	  	  	  The	  distinction	  between	  autonomy	  and	  heteronomy	  thus	  also	  has	  bearings	  on	  the	  makings	  and	  workings	  of	  cultural	  institutions,	  whether	  they	  are	  state	  institutions	  or	  non-­‐governmental	  organizations,	  and	  their	  particular	  ways	  of	  instituting.	  Does	  an	  institution,	  for	  example,	  only	  adhere	  to	  the	  logics	  and	  demands	  of	  the	  state	  and	  its	  governmentality,	  austerity,	  and	  benchmarking,	  does	  it	  therefore	  sheepishly	  follow	  the	  trends	  of	  the	  market	  or	  of	  academia,	  or	  does	  it	  seek	  another,	  more	  autonomous	  path?	  Obviously	  this	  has	  not	  only	  to	  do	  with	  funding	  structures,	  but	  also	  with	  articulation	  of	  one’s	  perceived	  public	  role,	  and	  with	  which	  social	  relations	  are	  instituted	  through	  spectatorship,	  participation,	  or	  even	  commonality:	  an	  institution	  institutes	  through	  more	  than	  its	  programming,	  but	  does	  so	  also	  in	  its	  spatial	  production,	  social	  relations	  within	  the	  workplace,	  production	  of	  subjectivity	  as	  spectatorship,	  and	  thus,	  in	  general,	  its	  instituted	  social	  imaginaries. But	  instituting	  is	  obviously	  not	  merely	  a	  theoretical	  proposition,	  and	  even	  though	  an	  essay	  such	  as	  the	  present	  one	  is	  engaged	  with	  the	  questions	  theoretically,	  by	  nature	  and	  by	  necessity,	  what	  is	  required	  are	  institutional	  practices—practices	  that	  are	  aware	  of	  their	  imaginary	  institution,	  and	  that	  institute	  not	  only	  on	  the	  level	  of	  representation	  and	  social	  signification,	  but	  also	  at	  the	  level	  of	  the	  magma,	  and	  thus	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  possibility	  for	  the	  radical	  imagination	  of	  difference.	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